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Abstract
The goal of the ACTS Project SEMPER (Secure Electronic Marketplace for
Europe) is to provide the first open and comprehensive framework for secure
commerce over the Internet and other public information networks. A proto-
type of the SEMPER Framework for Secure Electronic Commerce has been
implemented in the Java programming language. It includes the payment
systems SET, Chipper, Mandate and ecash. The prototype uses a distin-
guished user-interface for trustworthy user in- and output which enables to
use SEMPER on secure hardware.
This article describes the basic concepts of the SEMPER Framework for
Secure Electronic Commerce as well as experiences gained in the field trials
of the SEMPER software. In addition, we assess our achievements in com-
parison to more recent projects in electronic commerce.
1 Introduction
A wide range of businesses are rapidly moving to explore the huge potential of
networked information systems, especially with the Internet-based WWW
(World-Wide Web). Although the Internet has its roots in academia and is still
dominated by free-of-charge information, dramatic changes are expected in the
near future. The goal of the 9-million ECU project SEMPER (Secure Electronic
Marketplace for Europe) (SEMPER Consortium 1996a; SEMPER Consortium
1996b) is to provide the first open and comprehensive solution for secure com-
merce over the Internet and other public information networks.
The members of the SEMPER consortium are Commerzbank (D), Cryptomathic
(DK), DigiCash (NL), EUROCOM EXPERTISE (GR), Europay International
(B), FOGRA Forschungsgesellschaft Druck (D), GMD – German National Re-
search Center for Information Technology (D), IBM (CH, F), INTRACOM (GR),
KPN Research (NL), Otto-Versand (D), r3 security engineering /Entrust Tech-
nologies (CH), CNET (F), SINTEF (N), Stichting Mathematisch Centrum /CWI
(NL), Universities of Dortmund, Freiburg, and Saarbrücken (D). Sponsoring
partners are Banksys (B), Banque Generale du Luxembourg (LU), and Telekurs
(CH). IBM Zurich Research Laboratory provides the technical leadership for the
project.
1.1 Roles and Services in the Marketplace
As with a physical marketplace, the main purpose of an electronic marketplace is
to bring potential sellers and buyers together:
• Sellers offer their goods and buyers order these goods; together this is a two-
party negotiation, sometimes ending with an agreement.
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• Sellers deliver their goods and buyers make payments; together this is a two-
party (fair) exchange.
Buyers or sellers might be dissatisfied with what has happened so far, i.e., several
exception handlers and dispute handlers which may involve an arbiter are neces-
sary. In all these actions, the parties have specific security requirements, namely
integrity, confidentiality, and availability. Confidentiality includes anonymity,
which is often a requirement for browsing catalogues or for low-value purchases.
Examples of typical scenarios of electronic commerce are:
• Mail-order Retailing: A retailer accepts electronic orders and payments, based
on digital or conventional catalogues, and delivers physical goods.
• On-line Purchase of Information and Subscriptions: Like mail-order retailing,
but with digital, maybe copyright-protected goods that are delivered on-line.
• Electronic Mall: An organisation offers services for several service providers,
ranging from directory services (“index”) over content hosting to billing ser-
vices.
• Contract Signing: Two or more parties exchange signed copies of the same
statement.
Naturally, an open system for electronic commerce cannot be restricted to these
scenarios. It should be easily configurable and extensible to a broad range of dif-
ferent scenarios.
1.2 What is New in SEMPER?
SEMPER is the first project that aims at the complete picture of secure electronic
commerce, not just on specific pieces (like electronic payments), specific sce-
narios (like electronic on-line purchases) or specific products and protocols. (The
relation of selected projects on electronic commerce to SEMPER is explained in
more detail in Section 5. An overview on electronic commerce projects can be
found at <http://www.semper.org/sirene/outsideworld/ecommerce.html>).
SEMPER provides an open framework for electronic commerce. This includes a
legal framework as described in SEMPER Consortium 1999 as well as a techni-
cal framework which is described in this article. The technical framework en-
ables the integration of any protocol and product providing the necessary services
(see Section 3.6). Therefore, applications are not restricted to specific proprietary
technology or specific protocols. Another objective which distinguishes SEMPER
from other projects is the concept of “multi-party security”: SEMPER provides
verifiable security and privacy to all concerned parties. Some consequences are:
• SEMPER users can verify their own security with only minimal trust into
other parties. This is, e.g., done by providing evidence for all critical actions
so that these actions can be disputed at an arbiter in case of faults.
• SEMPER developed an integrated anonymity management scheme extending
the existing concepts for anonymous communication and credentials. This
means, e.g., that the user can start anonymous business scenarios where all
actions are guaranteed to be anonymous.
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1.3 Overview
This article first describes the SEMPER model of electronic commerce which
comprehends commerce as being a workflow of atomic transfers and fair ex-
changes of business items such as electronic goods. This is reflected by the
SEMPER Framework for Secure Electronic Commerce described in the next
section. The SEMPER Framework is structured in layers: The lower layers pro-
vide the busiess items, the transfers, and the fair exchanges. The higher layers
provide generic workflows for the most common commerce scenarios together
with means to configure them to the specific requirements of a particular user.
Then, we describe our experiences with field-trials of our prototype. We conclude
this article by a self-assessment which compares SEMPER with other more re-
cent frameworks for electronic commerce.
2 Model for Electronic Commerce
The SEMPER Framework described in this paper is based on a generic model for
two-party electronic commerce. This model describes the flow of control as well
as actions and decisions for commerce services.
Buyer
Seller
ServiceOffer Order Contract Pay/Receipt
satisfied
If not satisfied, raise specific exception / dispute handler
If not satisfied, raise specific exception / dispute handler
satisfied satisfied satisfied
satisfied satisfied satisfied satisfied satisfied
satisfied
Figure 1: Electronic Commerce is a Sequence of Transfers and Exchanges
Note that the protocol might enable other sequences as well, e.g., after “Contract”
“Payment without Receipt” might also be enabled.
The main idea of the model is to describe business scenarios in terms of se-
quences of transfers and fair exchanges of business items with decisions based on
The SEMPER Framework for Secure Electronic Commerce 173
the success of these actions (see Figure 1). This model is similar to the dialogues
of interactive EDI.
2.1 Atomic Actions: Transfers and Exchanges
The main interactive actions between two players are transfers and fair ex-
changes. In a transfer, one party sends business items to one or more other par-
ties. The sending and receiving parties can define certain security requirements,
such as confidentiality, anonymity, or non-repudiation of origin. More generally,
business items which can be transferred or exchanged include
• valuable information, such as a consultancy result, or program and video data,
• statements, such as signed documents or certificates, and
• money, such as credit-card, cash, or bank transfer payments.
A fair exchange is a simultaneous exchange of packages of business items typi-
cally among two parties. The parties have the assurance that their packages are
sent if and only if the peer entity sends its package as expected. Either both pack-
ages are exchanged or none. If no fairness guarantee is required, we can model
such an exchange by two transfers.
As an example of applying fair exchange imagine Bob has requested consultancy
services from Alice, e.g., a piece of software, a translation, or a legal expertise.
Alice wants to deliver to Bob a file containing the report. The file represents
work of several person-months, so Alice wants a receipt if Bob receives the file.
Bob, on the other hand, only wants to issue a receipt if he receives the file.
Figure 2 gives an overview of all possible exchanges of these primitive types.
Transfers are included as exchanges of “something” for “nothing.”
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2.2 Electronic Commerce: Sequence of Exchanges
Using transfers and exchanges, a typical business scenario is modelled as a se-
quence of exchanges with user-interaction and local decisions between successive
exchanges (see Figure 1).
In the course of an ongoing business, after each transfer or exchange, the parties
are either
• satisfied, and thus willing to proceed with a certain number of other transfers
or exchanges, or
• dissatisfied, in which case an exception or dispute is raised which might end
up at a real court if all else fails.
This local decision depends on the success of the previous exchanges, the items
received, and possibly user-input. After each round, a local decision as to whether
and how to proceed is made. These sequences are similar to workflows of ordi-
nary business transactions.
3 The SEMPER Framework
We now sketch the main services of the SEMPER Framework. After a short over-
view, we will sketch the layers bottom-up in more detail. For a complete descrip-
tion of SEMPER, we have to refer to the final documentation of the design
(SEMPER Consortium 1998b) as well as the final report (SEMPER Consortium
1999) containing a more fundamental view.
3.1 Overview
The SEMPER Framework (see Figure 3) is structured in layers. The lowest layer
deals with low-level security primitives and other supporting services, whereas
the highest layer deals with commerce issues only:
• The supporting services are the usual cryptographic services, communication,
secure archiving of data (keys, non-repudiation tokens, audit trail), setting
preferences, access control, and the trusted user interface “TINGUIN”. Fur-
thermore, it provides secure communication services such as confidential,
authenticated, or anonymous communication.
• The transfer layer provides services for transferring business items. This in-
cludes transfer-related security services such as non-repudiation of origin.
• The exchange layer supports fair exchange of business items.
• The commerce layer provides the local business sequences of our model
which are locally executed by each player. Examples are sequences like
“mail-order retailing,” “on-line purchase of information,” or “registration
with service provider.” It is configurable by downloading new services or ex-
tending existing ones.
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On top of these layers are so-called Business Applications. Business Applications
are neither a layer nor part of SEMPER, but our name for any application that
uses the SEMPER services. As Business Applications can be implemented out-
side SEMPER, they are a priori untrusted and not allowed to perform security-
critical actions without user authorisation.
Note that the security guaranteed by the layers gets larger and more abstract to-
wards the top: The transfer layer only guarantees secure transmission whereas the
commerce layer guarantees security of a whole commerce scenario.
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Figure 3: The SEMPER Framework for Secure Electronic Commerce
3.2 Supporting Services
Most supporting services as sketched above are not specific to electronic com-
merce. Except for a trusted user-interface “TINGUIN” (Trusted Interactive
Graphical User-Interface ), none of them was a primary objective of SEMPER.
The goal of the TINGUIN is to solve a common problem of Internet-based elec-
tronic commerce: In current electronic commerce sessions over the Internet the
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buyer typically interacts with the seller through his WWW-browser. As the
HTML-pages presented in the browser are under the control of the Web-server
(i.e., the seller), this exposes the buyer considerably. In particular, a message on
such a page saying that a given offer from the seller has been signed correctly,
cannot be trusted, as a crooked seller could simply put this on the HTML-page
without validating the signed offer (in fact the seller may not have signed the
offer at all). Another problem using the browser, is that any input supplied by the
user may be read by the seller. This may lead to considerable problems if, for
example, the buyer has to enter a PIN code or password in order to use an elec-
tronic purse or make a signature.
In our prototype, the TINGUIN is a secure and consistent user-interface in a fixed
window which can be clearly distinguished from other (browser) windows. All
normal service blocks of SEMPER interact with the TINGUIN block that pro-
vides this window, and they use some common look-and-feel elements that the
TINGUIN Block provides. Thus, all security-critical in- and outputs of a user
should be made via the TINGUIN. Together with the other SEMPER services,
this enables the user to be sure that the outputs at the TINGUIN have been locally
verified and to be warned that the inputs into the TINGUIN may have commer-
cial consequences.
Naturally, this interface must be under control of the user's own device, and it
must be difficult to fake the interface. The latter implies that the user must al-
ways be able to recognise the TINGUIN. Moreover, ergonomics has to be consid-
ered in the design of the TINGUIN even more carefully than usual, because any
misunderstanding by the user may destroy security.
3.3 Transfer Service
The transfer layer provides services for packaging and trading business items.
The basic items are electronic payments, credentials, and general statements
which include digital signatures and data. These business items can be bundled
into tree-like packages. The security attributes attached to each transfer deter-
mine the level of security which is required for the transfer or exchange of the
transferred item.
Each type of business item is managed by a separate manager which provides
unified services integrating existing implementations as described in Section 3.6.
Furthermore, the transfer services define interfaces of exchange-enabling proper-
ties used by the fair exchange protocols in Section 3.4.
3.4 Exchange Services
 The fair exchange services developed by SEMPER are optimistic and generic.
Optimistic means that a third party is only used in case of faults to restore fair-
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ness (Asokan/Schunter/Waidner 1997, pp. 6-17). Generic means that the fair
exchange protocols can be used to exchange arbitrary business items.
The reason why we developed generic fair exchange instead of using fair ex-
changes specific for each table cell in Figure 2 is that, e.g., a fair exchange proto-
col “payment for receipt” may work with one payment scheme but not with an-
other. So instead of having at most nine different protocols, each new imple-
mentation of an item may require new fair exchange protocols. Furthermore,
exchanging packages of items would require specific fair exchange protocols for
any fixed combination of items to be exchanged. Thus, for a given number of n
different kinds of electronic items this leads to n2 different fair exchange proto-
cols if one only wants to exchange one item for another. Furthermore, adding a
new item to be exchanged (such as a new payment module) means adding an-
other n+1 fair exchange protocols.
In order to achieve this independence of the actual items to be exchanged, we de-
fined a minimal set of “exchange-enabling properties” which are required to be
implemented by two transfers of business items in order to be usable in a fair
exchange protocol:
External Verifiability: The third party is enabled to check whether a transfer
was successful or not. This can, e.g., be achieved by sending or re-sending
the message via the third party.
Revocability: The third party is able to undo a transfer (e.g., revoking a
credit-card payment).
Generatability: The third party is able to redo a transfer (e.g., signing a re-
placement receipt).
Based on transfers with these exchange-enabling properties of the two items to be
exchanged, the so-called exchange manager negotiates with its peer which ge-
neric fair exchange protocol shall be used.
An example of such a generic fair exchange protocol as used in SEMPER is de-
picted in Figure 4. The protocol can be used to exchange any generatable item for
any externally verifiable item. It is similar to the protocol described in
(Asokan/Schunter/Waidner 1997, pp. 6-17): The basic idea is that the partici-
pants first agree on the exchange. If they agree, i.e., the descriptions of the ex-
pected items are fulfilled by the offered items, the responder transfers its item. If
the item matches the expectation of the originator, the originator then sends its
item as well. If the originator misbehaves and does not send its item, the re-
sponder complains at the third party which then produces an equivalent replace-
ment for the item (this can be done since the second item was generatable) if and
only if the first transfer was successful (this can be done using the external verifi-
ability provided by the first item). A more detailed description can be found in
(SEMPER Consortium 1998; SEMPER Consortium 1999).














 generateable transfer Tgen
Figure 4: Fair Exchange of Generateable and Externally Verifiable Transfers
Following the same pattern, other protocols can be built which guarantee fairness
if one of the items provides generatability and the other external verifiability or if
both offer revocability.
3.5 Commerce Services
The commerce layer implements the flow of control of our model using the
transfer and exchange service for interactions with the business partner, and the
supporting services for user interaction and persistent storage. It also performs
the trust management and access control necessary for downloading certified
commerce services.
In order to provide overall security, the commerce layer sets up security contexts
called “deals” which provide secure communication and signal certain commerce
security attributes to all ongoing protocols. An example of a security service sig-
nalled by a context is anonymity which has to be guaranteed by all blocks partici-
pating in the deal.
Inside these deals, the commerce layer then runs the sequences of our model that
directly implement protocols of business scenarios, e.g., how specific merchants
or types of merchants handle customer registration and offering, ordering, pay-
ment, and delivery of goods. It implements the local flow of control, i.e., the en-
abled sequences of exchanges, of the electronic commerce model for each player
separately. A set of client and server commerce services check each other. They
are like an automatically verified electronic equivalent of the “terms of business”
of the players. The commerce layer does not only offer entire commerce proto-
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cols, but also building blocks that may be of more general use, in particular
services to manage and fill out standardised order forms.
Note that the commerce layer services are usually structured in a hierarchy: An
offer/order or a payment/delivery building block can be used by a generic mail-
order service as well as a service for selling database access. Thus, in principle,
the commerce layer should provide transfer- and exchange-based work-flows
implementing all common commerce scenarios.
Since one cannot fix the set of services in advance, the commerce layer includes
services for secure downloading of services. This allows customers to participate
in business scenarios they never encountered before. Since arbitrary terms of
business may be implemented in a new commerce service, a downloaded service
need not be secure at all. Therefore, downloading must be supplemented by
evaluation and certification of downloadable services as well as proper access
control.
3.6 Openness with Service Managers and Service Modules
Up to now, we have only described generic services of each building block with-
out looking into the internal details of them. Now, we will describe the abstract
concept guaranteeing openness of the implementation (see Abad-Peiro et al.
1998, pp. 72-88) for a detailed design based on this abstract concept).
Generic services are provided by so-called service managers and several service
modules (see Figure 5). The union of a manager and its modules is called a ser-
vice block.
The service block provides the generic, unified service, e.g., service = “pay-
ment”, which includes services for managing modules.
The generic service is based on a model of the service which should cover a broad
range of protocols implementing this service, i.e., we have generic interfaces for
a whole class of services.
For instance, the external interface of the payment manager is based on a generic
payment service that will cover all kinds of payment protocols (or at most a small
number of generic payment services, one for each payment model such as ac-
count-based or cash-like). Note that this does not mean that we will support only
a few specific payment protocols, but that the interface definition is so general
that any reasonable payment protocol can be accessed via that interface. If, e.g.,
company XYZ comes up with a new payment system abc, all they have to do in
order to link abc into our architecture is to map the service interface of abc to the
internal payment interface. This guarantees the desired openness of the mar-
ketplace.
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Figure 5: Open Services with Managers, Modules and Adapters1
A service manager provides a common interface to several modules together with
methods for negotiation and selection of an appropriate module.
A service module corresponds to a protocol implementing the service, i.e., it
more or less implements one entity of such a protocol. Its interface to the service
manager is called an internal interface2 of this service.
Having several modules per service allows different protocol implementations by
different manufacturers. Service modules are said to be of the same type if their
behaviour at the internal interface is the same. Examples of types of internal pay-
ment interfaces are “cash-like”, and “account-based”. Modules could be “SET”,
and “e-cash” where “SET” implement the account-based model whereas “e-
cash” implements the cash-like model.
As SEMPER wants to build on existing products as far as possible, we cannot
assume that they all fit the same internal interfaces originally. Therefore, the
interface of an existing implementation is enhanced by a service adapter so that
the resulting module supports the required service.
                                                       
1 The last module is an example of a module written specifically for SEMPER and
needs no adapter.
2 This is also often called a Service Provider Interface (SPI).
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The SEMPER architecture describes a fixed set of service managers. The set of
service modules is not fixed, i.e., service modules can be dynamically attached to
managers.
4 The SEMPER Trials
The trials are based on the SEMPER software prototype which implements the
architecture and the basic security services. They are being conducted in various
business contexts, both internal and external to the project. A map of the trial
sites is depicted in Figure 6. Trial evaluation includes interviews of the trial users
to measure the degree to which the software meets perceived security require-










Figure 6: SEMPER Trial Sites
4.1 Internal SEMPER Trials
In July 1997 the SEMPER prototype was tested by two service providers which
are members of the project, Eurocom and Fogra. The Eurocom site, located in
Athens (GR), offers distance learning services. Eurocom intends to use SEMPER
to enable customers to browse their offering of courses, register and pay on-line
and, subsequently, gain on-line access to the selected course presentation, notes,
and examinations. Fogra, a research institute for the printing industry, located in
Munich (D), offers its customers on-line ordering and delivery of documents and
software.
The ”Basic Trial” SEMPER software was used for the supervised trials which
took place at Eurocom’s premises. The trials were integrated in a series of semi-
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nars for SME employees with the title ”Conducting Business over the Internet”.
After a brief presentation of the SEMPER architecture, the participants were able
to run the SEMPER software and to make a purchase of a seminar from the
Eurocom electronic store. Due to constraints of time, the SEMPER client soft-
ware was pre-installed and user registration had also been performed prior to the
trials. As a result, the participants experienced only the purse creation and pur-
chasing procedures. 30 people participated in the Eurocom trials.
In general, the Greek trial participants didn’t think that the Internet is mature
enough yet to perform business-to-business or business-to-customer transactions,
not due to the technology itself, but due to its limited use in their customer base.
The lack of a legal framework regarding the validity of electronic authentication
was also viewed as an obstacle to performing important business transactions
over the Internet. However, the general feeling was that these obstacles will be
resolved and that electronic commerce has much to offer to small and medium-
sized enterprises. The SEMPER software met most of the participant’s current
business requirements for traditional commerce, apart from cheques as a form of
payment. As a consequence, electronic cheques have been integrated into the
advanced prototype.
Fogra demonstrated the SEMPER trial for three days in June 1997 at the
IMPRINTA fair. Due to both software and access problems, trial of the scenario
was only partially successful. Before releasing the SEMPER code for external
testing, Fogra integrated a new version of the trusted user interface (TINGUIN),
including status bars and other enhancements. Five persons from the Fogra cus-
tomer base participated in ”unsupervised trials”.
The functionality and flexibility of the SEMPER architecture was greatly appreci-
ated by the Eurocom and Fogra trial participants, but the state of the user inter-
face was considered to be insufficiently developed for the ease of use to which
non-specialists are accustomed. As a result, a new round of supervised trials, with
participants selected on the basis of their networking experience, was conducted.
4.2 Supervised Basic Trial
In December 1997 the SEMPER software was installed at the Institute for Com-
puter Science and Social Studies at the University of Freiburg, Germany and
tested by 12 trial participants. Twenty hours of in-depth interview material was
recorded and has been analysed as the basis of the trial report(SEMPER Consor-
tium 1998a). In order to obtain a more critical evaluation of the software, trial
participants with extensive computing experience (and a minimum of 3 years
Internet use) and a good awareness of security issues were selected. The partici-
pants subjected the prototype to particularly thorough testing, checking, for ex-
ample, the software’s response to incorrect input (random seed too short, incor-
rect password entry, attempting to obtain a second certificate from the CA, at-
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tempting to continue without inputting the requested information, rejecting of-
fers, etc.) and were favourably impressed by its performance.
The Fogra business application and trial website, mentioned above, was used as
the trial site. The trial bank was also run from the Fogra server. The Certification
Authority (CA) was provided by the SEMPER CA at the GMD in Darmstadt,
Germany. Each trial participant initialised the locally installed SEMPER software
by completing the registration process and creating one or more purses. The reg-
istration procedure was based on the participant’s personal data (name, organi-
sation, city) which had been submitted to the certification authority prior to the
trial in order to simulate off-line personal registration. The participant also en-
tered a personal registration key which the CA had assigned to him/her.
Having completed the initialisation process, participants used the SEMPER soft-
ware for their first ”semperised” experience of electronic commerce. They used
the prototype to securely identify the Fogra website. They then browsed the Fogra
website and selected a digital product (e.g., an abstract from the Fogra literature
database). After filling out the order form on the Fogra website, they then re-
quested that their local SEMPER software process this order securely. They ob-
tained a digitally signed on-line offer from Fogra. They used their locally in-
stalled SEMPER software to send a digitally signed order to Fogra and used the
purse function of the SEMPER prototype to make a (simulated) on-line payment.
The abstract was delivered to the participant in the Netscape browser. The trusted
graphical user interface, TINGUIN, where all security relevant communications
take place, is the visible and vital link between the user and the SEMPER soft-
ware. As a result, it was subject to particular scrutiny. The credibility of the test
for the participants was enhanced by the fact that it was possible for them to
check the DOS (Java) window at all times during the test (and many did so). This
ensured them that the test was actually live, i.e. that they were really exchanging
certificates and business items with the CA and the bank and website servers in
Munich.
4.3 SME Trials
Currently, external trials are being conducted by SMEs in Holland and France.
They are also supported by the SEMPER basic security services and, in contrast
to the previous trials, include real on-line payment and a test version of the SET
purse. The OPL site (Oilfield Publications Limited; http://www.oilpubs.com/
semper) offers books, maps, documents, and database access for the oil and gas
industry. On-line payments using both credit cards and stored-value smartcards
have been implemented. Two additional sites are located in Sophia Antipolis (F).
ACRI (http://eurosud1.eurecom.fr/acrimall) provides access to a database of sat-
ellite images, processed and marked up with simulation. The second site is Acti-
mÈdia (http://www.cyberlandpro.com), which sells CD-ROMs to the French
speaking population world-wide. Simulated payments can be made by credit card
or the test SET purse. These trials are currently concluded.
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5 Self-Assessment
SEMPER is the only project aiming at securing electronic commerce as a whole.
In addition, multi-party security including automated disputes has not been con-
sidered by any other project.
Our prototype implementation does not achieve product-level quality. Neverthe-
less, we were able to use it in our trials which helped us to validate and refine the
SEMPER Framework.
Our model as well as our framework turned out to be a valuable tool for under-
standing and implementing electronic commerce. The design of some blocks in
our framework (such as the payment block) is very detailed and extended the
state of the art while some blocks may still gain from further refinement (e.g., the
commerce and supporting services layer).
An indication for the quality of the basic concepts of our framework is that only
minor changes to the SEMPER Framework were necessary during the course of
the project. Furthermore, frameworks of other projects considering only parts of
SEMPER integrate well into our framework:
• Payment Projects: Many projects aim at secure payments only (Aso-
kan/Janson/Steiner/Waidner 1997, pp. 28-35). During the course of the proj-
ect, we integrated five fundamentally different payment schemes (eCash, iKP,
SET, Mandate, and Chipper) without any problems. Therefore, we are con-
vinced that we are able to integrate other payment schemes as well.
• Java Electronic Commerce Framework [http://java.sun.com/commerce]:
This framework provides a more advanced design and implementation of our
supporting services. It would be an ideal completion towards product-
development based on the SEMPER Framework.
• Open Buying on the Internet [http://www.openbuy.org] considers business-to-
business commerce only. It is based on EDI and could be used to extend the
commerce layer.
• Open Trading Protocol [http://www.otp.org], and XML/EDI [http://www.
xmledi .net] define forms for business scenarios. They fit well into our con-
cept of commerce-layer services: These forms can be used for interaction with
the user and between commerce sequences on different machines.
• CommerceNet’s [http://www.commerce.net] plans to define forms as well as
processes for electronic commerce in their eCo Framework. Therefore, this
would be another option for work-flows on the commerce-layer.
To conclude, we feel that a redesign of our prototype into a product based on the
lessons learned and more recent implementations of some services should be
worth the effort. Furthermore, we feel that other projects will gain by keeping our
framework in mind even if they do not aim at the complete picture of electronic
commerce.
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